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I. Introduction
Microeconomists are increasingly taking an interest in intrahousehold
decision-making models for describing household consumption behav-
ior. This interest is fed by the methodological argument that individuals,
and not households, have preferences. As a consequence, the standard
unitary assumption that a household consisting of several individuals
behaves as if it were a single decision maker seems overly restrictive.
This methodological argument is further supported by the growing em-
pirical evidence that the unitary model for household consumption
behavior indeed does not provide an adequate description of observed
multiperson household behavior (see, e.g., Fortin and Lacroix 1997;
Browning and Chiappori 1998; Vermeulen 2005). Given this, the so-
called collective model for household consumption behavior (after Chiap-
pori [1988, 1992]) has become growingly popular for analyzing intra-
household decision-making processes. The collective model explicitly
recognizes that the household consists of multiple decision makers
(household members) with their own rational preferences. It only as-
sumes that the household consumption decisions are Pareto-efﬁcient
outcomes of an intrahousehold allocation/bargaining process.
This paper adopts a nonparametric approach for analyzing collective
consumption behavior. Speciﬁcally, in what follows, nonparametric anal-
ysis stands for “revealed preference” analysis in the tradition of, among
others, Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982). This nonparametric approach
is to be contrasted with the more standard parametric approach. In
terms of the collective consumption model, such a parametric approach
implicitly relies on nonveriﬁable assumptions regarding the functional
structure of preferences and the intrahousehold bargaining process.
Standard parametric tests check not only a model’s theoretical impli-
cations but also the ad hoc functional speciﬁcation that is assumed. A
rejection of a behavioral model may thus well be due to misspeciﬁcation
rather than to an inadequate theory as such. By deﬁnition, nonpara-
metric tests of consumption models do not assume any functional spec-
iﬁcation regarding the household consumption process. They directly
test the theoretical models on the raw quantity and price data by using
revealed preference axioms.
In this paper, we conduct a nonparametric empirical assessment of
the general collective consumption model introduced by Browning and
Chiappori (1998). This model considers general individual preferences
that allow for public consumption and consumption externalities within
the household. These features are particularly attractive in a household
context: many goods are (partially) publicly consumed (e.g., rent and
car use), and it seems natural to account for consumption externalities
(e.g., related to clothing; this also includes nonegoistic/altruistic pref-1076 journal of political economy
erences). In addition, the general model starts from the minimalistic
assumptions that the empirical analyst cannot determine which goods
are privately and/or publicly consumed within the household and that
there is no information on the intrahousehold allocation of the different
goods. Indeed, minimal information is usually available in real-life ap-
plications of household consumption models (including our own ap-
plication). Browning and Chiappori derived testable implications of this
general model for the case that starts from a parametric speciﬁcation
of the household members’ preferences and the intrahousehold bar-
gaining process; these results were further elaborated by Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006).
Browning and Chiappori also provided a parametric empirical as-
sessment of the unitary model and the general collective consumption
model for a time series of cross sections constructed on the basis of
Canadian household budget surveys. First, they empirically evaluated
the unitary model for one-person households (singles) and for two-
person households (couples). They found that the unitary model is
rejected for couples but not for singles. This suggests that there is some-
thing wrong with the preference aggregation assumptions that underlie
the unitary approach, that is, that multiperson households behave as
single decision makers. Next, Browning and Chiappori observed that
the general collective consumption model cannot be rejected for cou-
ples. Thus, they concluded that the collective model effectively consti-
tutes a more promising alternative for modeling the behavior of mul-
tiperson households. Still, these conclusions are based on parametric
tests and thus crucially depend on the functional form that is used for
representing the preferences and the intrahousehold bargaining
process.
This directly suggests a nonparametric analysis as a natural comple-
ment of Browning and Chiappori’s parametric analysis. Nonparametric
tests of collective consumption models have been very scarce up to
now. In fact, the few existing studies focus on the restrictive setting
of labor supply behavior of egoistic individuals. This setting implies a
number of convenient simpliﬁcations for the empirical analyst, such
as observability of the individuals’ labor supply and the exclusion of
public consumption within the household. For example, Snyder
(2000) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008) conducted empirical tests
of the nonparametric conditions derived by Chiappori (1988) for the
labor supply model with egoistic household members.
General collective consumption models with public goods and/or
externalities have not yet been tested nonparametrically on real-life data.
A ﬁrst objective of this paper is to ﬁll this gap. More speciﬁcally, we
provide a ﬁrst empirical application of the nonparametric “revealed
preference” conditions for data consistency with the general collectivecollective consumption models 1077
consumption model that have been derived by Cherchye, De Rock, and
Vermeulen (2007). In doing so, we consider a data set that is drawn
from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a nationally
representative survey of Russian households that was designed to eval-
uate the impact of Russian reforms on the economic well-being of house-
holds and individuals. The RLMS contains a lot of socioeconomic in-
formation such as detailed expenditures, incomes, assets, and health.
1
Although the RLMS survey design focuses on a longitudinal study of
populations of dwelling units, it allows a panel analysis of those house-
holds remaining in the original dwelling unit over time. As such, the
RLMS is one of the few surveys that enables constructing a very detailed
panel of household consumption. This panel structure of the RLMS is
particularly interesting because it permits nonparametric tests without
having to assume that preferences are homogeneous across similar in-
dividuals. Moreover, although our sample covers a time series of only
eight observations for each household, there is enough relative price
variation over time to test behavioral models in a meaningful way.
As for the practical implementation of the nonparametric tests of the
general collective model, an important consideration concerns the com-
putational burden of these tests. Interestingly, as we will show, some
basic theoretical insights can considerably enhance the computational
efﬁciency in practical applications. The derivation and application of
efﬁciency-enhancing testing mechanisms constitute a second objective
of this study.
If the general collective model cannot be rejected, a natural further
step consists in testing more restrictive versions of the collective model.
Evidently, such a more restrictive model implies a higher probability of
rejection. Usually, restrictions on the general collective model are de-
ﬁned in terms of individual preferences or the observability of certain
intrahousehold allocations. An example is Chiappori’s (1988, 1992) col-
lective labor supply model with egoistic preferences and observed in-
dividual labor. In the current study, we propose a novel approach to
model restricted versions of the general collective model, which does
not require speciﬁc assumptions regarding individual preferences or
observability of intrahousehold allocations. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
possibility of including alternative assumptions regarding the sharing
rule that applies to each household. This sharing rule deﬁnes the within-
household distribution of the household budget, so reﬂecting the in-
trahousehold bargaining power of the different household members. A
third objective of this paper is to nonparametrically test plausible but
more restrictive versions of the general collective consumption model,
1 For more details on the RLMS data, we refer the reader to http://www.cpc.unc.edu/
rlms/.1078 journal of political economy
which are deﬁned in terms of speciﬁc assumptions regarding the sharing
rule that underlies the observed household consumption behavior.
Finally, one potential drawback of a collective consumption model
that takes into account externalities and public consumption inside the
household is that its generality makes it hardly rejectable. The question
remains how powerful the theoretical implications are in real-life ap-
plications. Therefore, in addition to the nonparametric tests, we also
include a power analysis of the various speciﬁcations of the collective
consumption model. Such an analysis focuses on the probability of de-
tecting an alternative hypothesis (e.g., based on Becker’s [1962] notion
of irrational behavior) to the detriment of the behavioral model under
study. Bronars (1987) introduced power assessment tools for the non-
parametric test of the unitary model, and Andreoni and Harbaugh
(2006) provide a survey of nonparametric power assessment tools that
are currently available.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section II sets
the stage by recapturing nonparametric revealed preference tests of the
unitary model. It also introduces the RLMS data for our empirical ex-
ercises and includes the corresponding test results for the unitary model
(for singles and couples). Section III introduces a necessary condition
for data consistency with the general collective consumption model. In
addition, it proposes efﬁciency-enhancing mechanisms for practical ap-
plication of the necessity tests and presents the results for these necessity
tests applied to our RLMS data set. Section IV institutes the sharing
rule–based approach for modeling restricted versions of the general
collective consumption model. Section V subsequently contains the em-
pirical results for alternative speciﬁcations of the collective consumption
model, with a special focus on the power of the different speciﬁcations.
Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Nonparametric Tests of the Unitary Model
As indicated in the introduction, the unitary model treats the household
as if it were a single decision maker. This section presents a necessary
and sufﬁcient nonparametric condition for data consistency with the
unitary model. In addition, we introduce the RLMS data that are used
in our empirical exercises. For these data, we also discuss the test results
for the unitary model applied to one-person households (singles) and
to two-person households (couples).
A. A Necessary and Sufﬁcient Condition for the Unitary Model
Suppose that we observe T household consumption choices of n-valued
quantity bundles. For each observation j the vector denotes the
n q   j collective consumption models 1079
chosen quantities under the prices , and
n p   S p {(p ; q ), j p 1, j  jj
represents the set of all observations for the household under …,T}
study. The observed household choices are consistent with the unitary
model if there exists a single utility function U that rationalizes the set
of observations S, in the sense of the following deﬁnition. Throughout,
we will focus on utility functions that are continuous, monotonically
increasing, and concave.
Deﬁnition 1. Let S be a set of observations. A utility function U
provides a unitary rationalization of S if for each qj
U(q ) ≥ U(z) j
for all such that .
n    z   pz≤ pq  jj j
In other words, a unitary rationalization requires that each bundle
is utility maximizing subject to the budget constraint. A core result qj
within the nonparametric approach to the unitary model is that a unitary
rationalization of the data is possible if and only if the observed set S
is consistent with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP).
Deﬁnition 2. Let be a set of obser- S p {(p ; q ); j p 1, …, T} jj
vations. The set S satisﬁes GARP if there exist relations and R that R 0
meet the following rules:
i. if , then ;
   pq ≥ pq q R q ii ij i 0 j
ii. if , , …, for some (possibly empty) sequence q R qq R qq R q i 0 kk 0 lz 0 j
( ), then R ; k, l,… ,z qq ij
iii. if R , then .
   qq p q ≤ pq ij j j j i
In words, the bundle is “directly revealed preferred” over the bundle qi
(i.e., ) if was chosen when was equally attainable (i.e., qq R qq q ji 0 ji j
); see rule i. Next, the revealed preference relation R exploits
   pq ≥ pq ii ij
transitivity of preferences; see rule ii. Finally, rule iii imposes that the
bundle cannot be more expensive than any revealed preferred bundle qj
. qi
We thus have the following result (Varian 1982).
Proposition 1. Let S be a set of observations. There exists a utility
function U that provides a unitary rationalization of S if and only if S
satisﬁes GARP.
The GARP condition provides the basis for a test of unitary rationality;
it expresses the idea that the bundle is utility maximizing subject to qj
its budget constraint if and only if it is expenditure minimizing over
the revealed preferred set of bundles (i.e., whenever R
   qp q ≤ pq q ij j j i i
). For each observation, testing GARP consistency proceeds in two qj
steps: the ﬁrst step starts from the relations to subsequently construct R 0
the R relations (using Warshall’s algorithm; see Varian 1982), and the
second step checks the expenditure minimization condition.1080 journal of political economy
B. Data
As indicated in the introduction, our data are drawn from the RLMS.
The RLMS data collection started in 1992 and was held in two distinct
phases: phase I covers the period from 1992 to 1994, and phase II started
in 1994. Because phase I and phase II have a different sample design,
we take our data from phase II. Speciﬁcally, our data set covers the time
period between 1994 and 2003 (rounds V–XII). Because the RLMS does
not contain data for the years 1997 and 1999, this implies eight obser-
vations per household.
Our empirical study considers two samples of households: the ﬁrst
sample contains households that are adult singles, and the second sam-
ple contains adult couples. No household contains other persons such
as children and/or siblings. We select households in which all members
are employed to mitigate the issue of the nonseparability between con-
sumption and leisure (see Browning and Meghir 1991). Finally, we con-
sider only households that were observed in all the available rounds of
phase II of the RLMS. This results in a sample of 108 singles and a
sample of 148 couples.
In our empirical exercises, we focus on a fairly detailed commodity
bundle that consists of 21 nondurable goods: (1) bread, (2) potatoes,
(3) vegetables, (4) fruit, (5) meat, (6) dairy products, (7) fat, (8) sugar,
(9) eggs, (10) ﬁsh, (11) other food items, (12) alcohol, (13) tobacco,
(14) food outside the home, (15) clothing, (16) car fuel, (17) wood
fuel, (18) gas fuel, (19) luxury goods, (20) services, and (21) rent.
Although the disaggregation of food items may appear far too detailed,
it should be noted that the average budget share of food equals 40
percent for the selected sample. For a given census region, we obtain
prices by averaging recorded prices across all households in that region.
Some of the goods that we use are aggregate goods. The price index
for a composite commodity is the weighted geometric mean of the prices
of the different items in the aggregate good, with weights equal to the
average budget shares in a given census region (i.e., the Stone price
index).
In anticipation of the empirical results, it should be stressed that we
apply the nonparametric collective rationality test to each separate
household, which implies that each household’s quantity and price ob-
servations form a separate set S with and . The fact that T p 8 n p 21
we test the unitary model (and, in the next sections, the collective
model) for each household separately avoids possibly controversial pref-





GARP rejected 0 .00
GARP not rejected 108 100.00
Couples:
GARP rejected 31 20.95
GARP not rejected 117 79.05
C. Empirical Results
As a ﬁrst step, we assess the empirical performance of the unitary model
for singles and for couples. By construction, the theoretical predictions
of the unitary approach and the collective approach coincide for singles.
But, in general, they differ for couples. Thus, if we do not reject the
unitary model for singles but we reject the unitary model for couples,
then this suggests that the aggregation assumptions that underlie the
unitary modeling of couples’ behavior are potentially harmful. In ad-
dition, given that deﬁnition 1 assumes the same utility function for all
observed consumption choices, nonrejection of the unitary model for
singles provides empirical support for the assumption that individual
preferences remain constant over the period under study; in the fol-
lowing sections, we will maintain this constant preferences assumption
when interpreting our test results for the collective model.
Table 1 gives the test results. We ﬁnd that all singles pass the unitary
rationality test, and thus, we cannot reject the assumption of constant
individual preferences for these data. By contrast, no less than about
21 percent of the couples fail the unitary rationality test. For these
couples, it is impossible to construct a single utility function that ratio-
nalizes the observed behavior, or these couples do not seem to behave
as single decision makers. In our opinion, this ﬁnding questions the
harmless nature of the aggregation assumption in the unitary approach
to modeling couples’ behavior. In turn, this suggests the collective ap-
proach as potentially more fruitful for rationalizing this behavior. This
will be investigated in the next sections.
Before doing so, we provide a somewhat more detailed investigation
of the unitary GARP violations for our sample of couples. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁgure 1 presents continuous subperiods of the data that satisfy GARP.
We observe 10 different patterns. The ﬁrst pattern corresponds to the
117 couples that are consistent with GARP when taking the eight period
observations together; patterns 2–10 correspond to the remaining 31
GARP violating couples. For example, for pattern 2 (which applies to
seven couples in our sample) the chronological sequence runs into a1082 journal of political economy
Fig. 1.—Continuous periods that satisfy GARP for couples
violation of GARP when period observation 3 is added. For these cou-
ples, we can divide the entire period into two continuous subperiods
that are consistent with GARP: the ﬁrst subperiod captures observations
1 and 2, and the second subperiod captures observations 3–8. An anal-
ogous interpretation applies to the remaining patterns in ﬁgure 1.
Interestingly, the collective model provides an intuitive interpretation
for the patterns reported in ﬁgure 1. We recall that the collective model
describes observed household consumption behavior as the outcome of
an intrahousehold bargaining process between rational individuals. In
this respect, we note that the empirical restrictions of the unitary model
coincide with those of the collective model if the bargaining power is
kept constant over all observed consumption choices (i.e., the members’
utility functions can be aggregated into a single household utility func-
tion; see also Browning and Chiappori 1998). Thus, when we maintain
the assumption of constant preferences (based on our results for singles;
see above), observed GARP violations reveal a shift in the bargaining
power within the household. For example, the collective model can
rationalize the behavior of the couples corresponding to pattern 2 in
ﬁgure 1 by allowing a bargaining power shift between periods 6 and 7.
In our empirical exercise in Section V, we will return in more detail to
this particular collective rationalization of the unitary GARP violations.
III. Nonparametric Tests of the General Collective Model
This section presents the general collective consumption model and
introduces a necessary condition for data consistency with this modelcollective consumption models 1083
that can be tested on the basis of the available price and quantity data.
We also provide an efﬁcient procedure for testing the necessary con-
dition. Finally, we demonstrate the testing procedure for our RLMS data
set.
A. A Necessary Condition for the Collective Model
A fundamental characteristic of the collective approach is that each
individual household member has her or his own rational preferences,
which can be represented by individual utility functions. The observed
household consumption is then regarded as the Pareto-efﬁcient out-
come of a within-household bargaining/allocation process. We next de-
ﬁne collective rationality for two-member (1 and 2) households. Essen-
tially, our following discussion (including propositions 2 and 3 below)
will recapture the main arguments of Cherchye et al. (2007).
As before, we start from the set of observed S p {(p ; q ); j p 1, …, T} jj
consumption choices. The general model makes the distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, publicly consumed quantities and, and the
other hand, privately consumed quantities for each individual house-
hold member. Given this, for observed aggregate quantities we deﬁne qj
feasible personalized quantities as ˆ qj
12h 12hn 12h ˆ q p ( ,  ,  ) with  ,  ,    and      p q .( 1 ) jj j j j j j  jjj j
Each captures a feasible decomposition of the aggregate quantities ˆ qj
into private quantities for the two household members ( and )
12 q  j jj
and public quantities ( ). Importantly, we focus on “feasible” person-
h j
alized quantities in our empirical analysis because we assume that the
“true” private and public quantities are not observed by the empirical
analyst. In addition, because we account for externalities and public
consumption, the household members’ utility functions and have
12 UU
the (unobserved) private and public quantities, and not the (observed)
aggregate quantities, as arguments.
The observed household choices are consistent with the collective
model if there exists a pair of utility functions and such that the
12 UU
observed household consumption can be represented as the Pareto-
efﬁcient outcome of some within-household bargaining process. If this
is the case, then a collective rationalization of the set S is possible.
Deﬁnition 3. Let S be a set of observations. A pair of utility func-
tions and provide a collective rationalization of S if for each
12 UU qj
there exist feasible personalized quantities and such that
n ˆ q m   jj 
12 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ U (q )  mU (q ) ≥ U (z)  mU (z) jjj j
for all with and .
12h 12hn   12h   ˆ z p ( ,  ,  )  ,  ,    p(     ) ≤ pq  jj j1084 journal of political economy
Thus, a collective rationalization of the set S is possible if and only if
there exist, for each observation j, feasible personalized quantities ˆ qj
that maximize a weighted sum of household member utilities and
1 U
for the given household budget . In this deﬁnition, the Pareto
2   U pq jj
weights represent the relative bargaining power (vis-a `-vis individual mj
1) of household member 2. A greater bargaining power implies, ceteris
paribus, a higher utility level for the corresponding individual. Impor-
tantly, this higher utility is not necessarily “produced” by a more favor-
able own private consumption bundle: it may also follow from individual
1’s private consumption (through externalities) or from publicly con-
sumed quantities. We remark that the value of depends on j, which mj
indicates that the bargaining power can vary across different observa-
tions.
We next establish nonparametric conditions for a collective rational-
ization of a given set S. To do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne feasible personalized prices
for observed aggregate prices , as follows:
12 ˆˆ (p , p ) p jj j
11 2 h 21 2 h ˆˆ p p ( ,  ,  )a n dp p (p   , p   , p   ) (2) j jjj j j jj jj j
with and ( , 2, h). This concept complements
12hn c  ,  ,     ≤ p c p 1 jjj  jj
the concept of feasible personalized quantities in (1): and capture
12 ˆˆ pp jj
the fraction of the price for the personalized quantities that is borne ˆ qj
by, respectively, member 1 and member 2; and pertain to private
12  jj
quantities and to public quantities. These prices can also be inter-
h j
preted as Lindahl prices: they reﬂect the willingness to pay of each
individual household member for the quantities that are consumed. If
there were no externalities, which corresponds to the collective model
with egoistic preferences that was mentioned in the introduction, then
and . In the general model under consideration, however,
12  p p  p 0 jj j
we can have and .
12  ( p  ( 0 jj j
On the basis of (1) and (2), we deﬁne a set of feasible personalized prices
and quantities
12 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ S p {(p , p ; q ); j p 1, …, T}. jj j
Using this concept, we obtain the following nonparametric condition
for a collective rationalization of the set S, which provides a decentralized
representation of collectively rational behavior.
Proposition 2. Let S be a set of observations. There exists a pair
of utility functions and that provide a collective rationalization
12 UU
of S if and only if there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and
quantities such that the corresponding sets
1 ˆ ˆˆ S {(p , q ); j p 1, …, T} jj
and simultaneously satisfy GARP.
2 ˆˆ {(p , q ); j p 1, …, T} jj
Hence, while unitary rationality requires GARP consistency of the
observed set S (proposition 1), collective rationality requires GARP con-collective consumption models 1085
sistency at the level of each individual member m ( , 2) in terms m p 1
of feasible personalized prices and quantities . This GARP consis-
m ˆˆ pq jj
tency requirement for each member m complies with the required mem-
ber-speciﬁc utility function in the collective rationalization condition
m U
in deﬁnition 3. Unfortunately, this decentralized representation of col-
lective rationality does not directly yield a test for collective rationality
that has practical usefulness, because we observe only the set S and not
some set . Clearly, in general, a given set S can deﬁne inﬁnitely many ˆ S
feasible sets . ˆ S
Given this, our following analysis will focus on a necessary condition
for collective rationality that uses solely the available price and quantity
data captured by the set S. Essentially, the condition imposes empirical
restrictions on hypothetical preference relations and , which cap-
mm HH 0
ture “feasible” speciﬁcations of the individual preference relations given
the information that is revealed by the set S: ( ) means
mm q H qq H q ij i 0 j
that we “hypothesize” that member m (directly) prefers the quantities
over the quantities . We note that, while—of course—the “true” qq ij
member-speciﬁc preferences are expressed in terms of (unobserved)
privately and publicly consumed quantities, we deﬁne the hypothetical
relations and in terms of the (observed) aggregate quantities,
mm HH 0
because we focus on observable implications of the collective consump-
tion model.
The next result deﬁnes a number of rules in terms of these hypo-
thetical relations that must be satisﬁed for a collective rationalization
of the data to be possible. We discuss the intuition of the different rules
directly after the proposition; this will make clear that the relations
and extend the unitary revealed preference relations and R
mm HH R 0 0
in deﬁnition 2 by exploiting the Pareto efﬁciency interpretation of col-
lectively rational behavior.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions
and that provide a collective rationalization of the set of obser-
12 UU
vations S. Then there exist hypothetical relations and for each
mm HH 0
member such that the following rules apply: m  {1, 2}
i. if , then or ;
   12 pq ≥ pq q H qq H q ii ij i 0 ji 0 j
ii. if , , …, for some (possibly empty) sequence
mm m q H qq H qq H q i 0 kk0 lz 0 j
( ), then ;
m k, l,… ,z q H q ij
iii. if and , then (with );
   ml pq ≥ pq q H qq H q m ( l ii ij j i i 0 j
iv. if and , then (with );
   ml pq ≥ p(q  q ) q H qq H q m ( l ii i j j j i i 0 j
12 1 2
v. if and , then ;
12    q H qq H qp q ≤ p(q  q ) ij ij j j j i i
12 1 2
vi. if and , then .
12    q H qq H qp q ≤ pq ij ij j j j i
This necessary condition has a direct interpretation in terms of the
Pareto efﬁciency requirement that underlies collective rationality. First,1086 journal of political economy
rule i states that if the household has chosen the bundle when the qi
bundle was equally available ( ), then we always have that
   qp q ≥ pq ji i i j
at least one household member must prefer the former bundle to the
latter (i.e., or ). Rule ii deﬁnes the transitive closures
12 q H qq H q i 0 ji 0 j
and of the relations and ; it imposes transitivity of the
12 12 HH HH 00
member-speciﬁc preferences.
The interpretation of the remaining rules iii–vi pertains to the very
nature of the collective model. More speciﬁcally, the four rules relate
to rationality across household members in terms of the hypothetical pref-
erence relations and . Rule iii expresses that, if member m prefers
mm HH 0
the bundle over the bundle for not more expensive than , qq q q ji j i
then the choice of the bundle can be rationalized only if the other qi
member l prefers over . Indeed, if this last condition were not qq ij
satisﬁed, then the bundle (under the given prices and outlay qp ji
) would imply a Pareto improvement over the chosen bundle .
  pq q ii i
Similarly, the meaning of rule iv is that if is more expensive than the qi
sum of and and member m prefers over , then the choice qq q q jj j i 12 1
of the bundle can be Pareto efﬁcient only if the other member l qi
prefers over . qq ij 2
Rules i–iv deﬁne restrictions on the relations and . For a spec-
mm HH 0
iﬁcation of these relations, rules v and vi deﬁne expenditure upper
bounds. First, rule v complements rule iv: if members 1 and 2 prefer,
respectively, and over , then the choice of the bundle can qq q q ii j j 12
be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than the sum of and qi1
. Indeed, if this last condition were not met, then for the given prices qi2
and outlay , both members would be better off by buying the
  pp q jj j
summed quantities rather than the chosen bundle , which q  qq ii j 12
of course conﬂicts with collective rationality. Finally, rule vi considers
the special case in which both members prefer the same bundle over qi
; in that case, Pareto efﬁciency requires that, under the prices , the qp j j
bundle cannot be associated with a strictly higher expenditure level qj
than . qi
As a ﬁnal remark, it is interesting to note that the necessary condition
in proposition 3 has a structure analogous to the that of the GARP
condition in deﬁnition 2, which applies to the unitary model. Speciﬁ-
cally, GARP states (in the unitary case) rationality conditions in terms
of the preference information that is revealed by the observed price
and quantity data (see the relations R and in deﬁnition 2). Essentially, R 0
the necessary condition in proposition 3 does the same, but now the
revealed preference information is understood in terms of the collective
model of household consumption and, thus, pertains to the individual
household members (see the relations and in proposition 3).
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B. Efﬁcient Tests of the Necessary Condition
The efﬁciency-enhancing mechanisms that we present in this section
are based on the algorithm described in detail in appendix G of Cher-
chye et al. (2007). Basically, that algorithm checks the necessary con-
dition in proposition 3 for each possible conﬁguration of the hypo-
thetical relations. More formally, for any couple of observations (i, j)
for which , we must hypothesize or ; this
   12 pq ≥ pq q H qq H q ii ij i 0 ji 0 j
implies three possible scenarios for each couple (i, j): ,
12 q H qq H i 0 ji0
, and ( ). For every combination of the respective
12 qq H q ∧ q H q ji 0 ji 0 j
scenarios, the algorithm constructs the transitive closures and
12 HH
(using Warshall’s algorithm, as for the unitary GARP test) and subse-
quently checks consistency with rules iii–vi of proposition 3. The algo-
rithm concludes consistency with the necessary condition in proposition
3 as soon as there is one construction of the relations and that
12 HH
simultaneously meets rules iii–vi of proposition 3.
Given all this, the test implies checking the necessary condition for
at most conﬁgurations of the hypothetical relations. Although this
2 T 3
is an extreme situation, also other more realistic situations may be com-
putationally burdensome if there are many observations. This may be
problematic even for present-day computers. We next present mecha-
nisms that can considerably enhance the efﬁciency of the necessity tests.
Essentially, starting from the unitary GARP test, these mechanisms con-
struct mutually independent subsets of observations for which the nec-
essary condition can be tested separately (using the above-mentioned
algorithm).
Unitary GARP Testing
The efﬁciency-enhancing testing mechanisms build further on the re-
sults for the unitary GARP test; see deﬁnition 2. More speciﬁcally, they
concentrate on the GARP violating condition for a couple of observa-
tions (i, j), that is,
   q R q and pq 1 pq. (3) ij j jj i
The basic insight is that, if the GARP violating condition (3) is not
met, the couple (i, j) cannot be involved (at the level of the individual
household members) in a rejection of the necessary condition for a
collective rationalization of the data. Speciﬁcally, in such a case each
constellation of the member-speciﬁc hypothetical relations and
1 H
consistent with rules i–iv in proposition 3 will never imply a violation
2 H
of rules v and vi of proposition 3 that involves i and j. This is obtained
by noting that ( or 2) only if R , which in turn entails
m q H q m p 1 qq ij i j
given that the GARP violating condition (3) is not met. In-
   pq ≤ pq jj ji1088 journal of political economy
deed, by construction, the combination of with is
m    q H qp q ≤ pq ij j j j i
always consistent with rules v and vi of proposition 3. Clearly, the order
of the GARP violating couple (i, j) is relevant: the empirical content of
the condition ( R ∧ ) is different from that of ( R ∧
   qqp q 1 pq q q ijj j j i ji
).
   pq 1 pq ii ij
Filtering
The ﬁrst step of the procedure, which we call “ﬁltering,” drops from
the original data set observations that are uninformative for the necessity
test. Speciﬁcally, it uses the above insight to concentrate exclusively on
couples of observations (i, j) that satisfy the GARP violating condition
(3). Of course, given the construction of the member-speciﬁc hypo-
thetical relations and , we must also include the sequence(s) of
12 HH
observations k that lie between i and j ( R and R ). More qq qq ik kj
generally, for each couple (i, j) we deﬁne the set
{kFq R q and q R q } if (3) ik kj Seq(i, j) p {M if not (3).
It follows from our above argument that we can concentrate on the
union of the sets ; we further refer to that union as Useq. Seq(i, j)
Intuitively, this means focusing on the couples of observations i and j
(and the associated in-between observations k) that cannot be ratio-
nalized by the unitary model.
The observations that do not belong to some as deﬁned Seq(i, j)
above are uninformative for the necessity test. Given the exponential
increase of the number of computations needed to test collective ratio-
nality for larger data sets, excluding these observations may considerably
shorten the time needed to reach a verdict. In fact, GARP consistency
of a particular sample means that all observations are dropped by con-
struction. In that case, all observations are uninformative for the col-
lective necessity test, meaning that the test itself becomes redundant.
Subset Testing
The second step, which we refer to as “subset testing,” partitions the
(ﬁltered) data set Useq into subsets that are mutually independent
when testing the necessary condition. In this context, mutual indepen-
dence indicates that for any two subsets, say and (with
12 Useq Useq
and ), we have that does not
ll 1 ∪ Useq P Useq ∩ Useq p M Useq lp1,2 lp1,2
include observations that are implicated in some GARP violation con-
tained in the subset , and vice versa. Formally, this means that for
2 Useq
each combination of couples and
11 (i , j )  Useq # Useq (i , j )  11 22
, we have ( , ).


























Indeed, an argument similar to one before implies that we may restrict
to testing the necessary condition for a collective rationalization of the
data at the level of the separate subsets rather than the (unpartitioned)
union Useq. Again, this subset testing may considerably reduce the com-
putational burden of the necessity test, especially when the number of
mutually independent subsets gets large.
C. Empirical Results
We next test collective rationality for the 148 couples in the RLMS data
set introduced in Section II. Cherchye et al. (2007) established that
falsiﬁcation of the general collective model requires (at least) three
goods and three observations. Hence, given that each household is
observed eight times and the commodity bundle consists of 21 goods,
the general collective model is potentially rejectable.
Table 2 summarizes the empirical results for the necessity test of the
general collective consumption model. It is clear from panel A of the
table that all couples in our sample pass the necessity test. Thus, we
cannot reject collective rationality for any of the 148 couples.
Panel B of table 2 reports the results of the ﬁltering procedure. In1090 journal of political economy
this respect, we recall from our discussion of table 1 that the consump-
tion behavior of 117 couples (79 percent out of the 148 couples) can
be described by means of a unitary model; that is, their sets of observed
quantity-price bundles satisfy the GARP condition. Following our ﬁlter-
ing procedure, all eight observations of these households are uninforma-
tive for the necessity test in the sense described above. Next, all house-
holds that do not pass the GARP test have at least three uninformative
observations. In fact, most of these households have ﬁve or six unin-
formative observations, which considerably favors the efﬁciency of the
necessity test algorithm. This indicates that the ﬁltering procedure con-
siderably enhances the efﬁciency of the testing algorithm in practical
applications.
The results of the subset testing procedure are given in panel C of
table 2. For most households that do not satisfy GARP, only a single
subset can be created from the original data sets. In such cases, all
informative observations are linked to each other via revealed prefer-
ence relations, which makes a separate analysis of subsets impossible.
For one household, we can distinguish two subsets for which the nec-
essary conditions can be tested separately. It has ﬁve informative ob-
servations, which are allocated to subsets with, respectively, two and three
observations. More generally, one may expect this subset procedure to
be particularly useful for larger data sets.
What can we infer from these results? A ﬁrst conclusion is that the
general collective consumption model seems to provide an adequate
description of the observed consumption behavior of the couples in
our sample, at least if the evaluation criterion is nonrejection of its
theoretical implications when tested on real data. Two arguments pro-
vide additional support for this conclusion. First, we performed the
nonparametric tests at the individual household level, which excludes
the interpretation of the GARP violations as revealing cross-sectional
unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we recall that the unitary model was
not rejected for singles (see table 1), which empirically motivates the
assumption that individual preferences are constant, so that we can
effectively interpret the unitary GARP violations for couples in terms of
bargaining power shifts.
Another conclusion may be that the theoretical implications of the
general collective consumption model are simply too generous to obtain
violations from real-life data. This alternative interpretation motivates
our next section, which discusses how far we can go in restricting the
general model. The empirical assessment in Section V also includes a
power analysis of the restricted collective consumption model, which
should give a deeper insight into the effective generosity of the alter-
native model speciﬁcations.
Finally, the following analysis focuses on sufﬁcient conditions for col-collective consumption models 1091
lective rationality, which naturally complements this ﬁrst-step assessment
of the necessary condition. In particular, while the results in table 2
imply that we cannot exclude a collective rationalization of the data,
these further sufﬁciency results will reveal whether or not it is certainly
feasible to deﬁne (restricted) collective consumption models that ratio-
nalize the observed couples’ behavior.
IV. Restricting the General Collective Model: A New Approach
If the general collective model cannot be rejected, one can investigate
the extent to which more restrictive models are equally plausible. This
section proposes a novel way to deﬁne restrictions on the general col-
lective model. Speciﬁcally, the restrictions directly constrain the sharing
rule that applies within each household. After introducing some general
concepts, we present operational sufﬁcient conditions that enable test-
ing data consistency with collective rationality under alternative speci-
ﬁcations of the sharing rule restrictions. As we will indicate, these suf-
ﬁciency tests actually boil down to verifying the unitary GARP condition
on a transformed data set. This suggests the consumption models that
underlie the sufﬁciency tests as direct collective extensions of the unitary
model.
A. Collective Rationality under Sharing Rule Restrictions
We suggest an approach that is as general as possible with respect to
the structure of individual preferences and the nonobservability of in-
trahousehold allocations. The approach is based on the decentralized
representation of collective rationality in proposition 2. This represen-
tation implies that observed household consumption can also be con-
ceived as if it results from a two-step allocation procedure, in the fol-
lowing sense. In the ﬁrst step, individuals divide the household’s total
expenditures/income between each other. In the second step, each
individual member m ( , 2) maximizes her or his utility in terms m p 1
of the privately and publicly consumed quantities for the given income
share and personalized prices. This second step corresponds to the
GARP condition for each member m in proposition 2, which effectively
implies that each member behaves utility maximizing in terms of a
member-speciﬁc function .
m U
In formal terms, we can restate the collective rationalization condition
in deﬁnition 3 as follows: a pair of utility functions and provides
12 UU
a collective rationalization of S if for each there exists a set of feasible qj
personalized prices and quantities such
12 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ S p {(p , p ; q ); j p 1, …, T} jj j1092 journal of political economy
that, for each individual member m,
mm 12h ˆˆ ˆ U (q ) ≥ U (z) for all z p ( ,  ,  ) (4) j
with and . This member-speciﬁc utility max-
12hn m   m   ˆˆ ˆˆ  ,  ,    (p )z ≤ (p )q  jj j
imization condition corresponds to the second step of the two-step rep-
resentation introduced above. As for the ﬁrst step, the income share
allocated to each member m corresponds to . Clearly,
mm    ˆˆ ˆ h p (p )q /pq jj j j j
we have . Given that the shares and are expressed in
12 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ h  h p 1 hh jj j j
terms of feasible personalized prices and quantities, we call them feasible
income shares.
In fact, this two-step representation of the general collective model
is directly similar to the well-known two-step representation of collective
models with egoistic agents and without public consumption, which has
formed the theoretical basis for many collective rationality tests (see,
e.g., Chiappori 1988; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Cherchye and Vermeulen
2008). An important difference is that in the general model the utility
of each individual household member does not depend only on her
m U
or his own private consumption, but also on the other member’s private
consumption and on the public consumption. This also makes that the
budget constraint is deﬁned in terms of (unobserved)
m   m   ˆˆ ˆˆ (p )z ≤ (p )q jj j
personalized prices rather than (observed) aggregate prices.
The income shares of the different household members are deter-
mined by the sharing rule, which thus governs the within-household
distribution of the household income. As such, the sharing rule reﬂects
the bargaining power of the different household members in the house-
hold allocation process; we recall that in deﬁnition 3 this bargaining
power is captured by the Pareto weights. (Browning, Chiappori, and
Lewbel [2006] provide a formal discussion of the relation between a
member’s income share and her or his bargaining power.) It follows
from the two-step representation that the sharing rule is determined
before the actual consumption choices take place; this parallels the
modeling of the bargaining power, with exogenously determined Pa-
reto/bargaining weights, in the collective approach.
In what follows, we will focus on restricted collective consumption
models that essentially constrain the feasible income shares and ;
12 ˆˆ hh jj
these restricted models capture speciﬁc assumptions regarding the shar-
ing rule that underlies the observed household consumption behavior.
In particular, we focus on a broad class of special cases of the general
collective model that can be deﬁned through alternative sharing rule
restrictions of the form , which impose that each indi-
m ˆ a ≤ h ≤ 1  a j
vidual receives a share of at least . For example, a can then a  [0, 0.5]
be interpreted as a minimum requirement for both individuals to pre-
vent the dissolution of the couple.collective consumption models 1093
To avoid any possible confusion, we stress that sharing rule restrictions
do not imply any speciﬁc assumption regarding the true (unobserved)
values of the personalized quantities or prices, but only regarding their
product. More formally, it is easy to verify that, for any given share
1 ˆ hj
and any given personalized quantities (or, conversely, and ), one
12 ˆˆ ˆ qp p jj j
can always ﬁnd personalized prices and (or ) such that
12 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ pp q h p jj j j
and . In other words, sharing rule re-
1    12    ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ (p )q /pq 1  h p (p )q /pq jj j j j jj j j
strictions do not exclude public consumption and externalities (or non-
egoistic/altruistic preferences).
On the basis of (4), the condition for a collective rationalization of
a set of observations S under the additional sharing rule restrictions
is deﬁned as follows.
m ˆ a ≤ h ≤ 1  a j
Deﬁnition 4. Let S be a set of observations and . A a  [0, 0.5]
pair of utility functions and provides an a-restricted collective
12 UU
rationalization (a-CR) of S if there exists a set of feasible personalized
prices and quantities such that, for each
12 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ S p {(p , p ; q); j p 1, …, T} jj j
individual member m ( , 2), m p 1
mm 12h ˆˆ ˆ U (q ) ≥ U (z) for all z p ( ,  ,  ) j
with and , for feasible income shares
12hn m   m   ˆˆˆ  ,  ,    (p )z ≤ h (pq)  jj j j
that satisfy
mm    ˆˆ ˆ h p (p )q /(pq) jj j j j
m ˆ a ≤ h ≤ 1  a. j
B. Sufﬁcient Conditions for Collective Rationality
Contrary to Section II, we focus exclusively on sufﬁcient collective ra-
tionality conditions in the following. Consistency with the sufﬁcient con-
dition (for particular a) means that there certainly exists at least one
speciﬁcation of the intrahousehold allocation that guarantees consis-
tency of observed behavior with collective rationality as deﬁned in def-
inition 4. The next result speciﬁes the sufﬁcient condition.
2
Proposition 4. Let S be a set of observations and . A a  [0, 0.5]
pair of utility functions and provides an a-restricted collective
12 UU
rationalization (a-CR) of the observed set S if there exists a partitioning
, ( ; ) with
1   ˆˆ NN N ∪ N p {1, …, T} N ∩ N p M (j  N ⇒ (p )q p 121 2 1 2 1 ij
and
  1    ˆˆ apq Gi  {1, …, T}) (j  N ⇒ (p )q p (1  a)pq Gi  {1, ij 2 ij i j
, such that both individual household members meet the cor- …, T})
responding GARP conditions.
2 The explanation following the proposition provides the intuition of the result.Aformal
proof is obtained along lines directly similar to the proof of proposition 4 in Cherchye
et al. (2007), which establishesasufﬁcientconditionforthegeneralcollectiveconsumption
model.1094 journal of political economy
This sufﬁcient condition can be interpreted as follows. For we j  N1
impose (and thus ) by setting for all
12 1    ˆˆ ˆˆ h p ah p 1  a (p )q p apq jj i j i j
i. Alternatively, for we impose (and ) by setting
12 ˆˆ j  N h p 1  ah p a 2 jj
for all i. Given this, the construction of the sets
1    ˆˆ (p )q p (1  a)pq ij i j
and corresponds to transforming the set S into two sets, and NN S 12 1
, that must both satisfy GARP; intuitively, these sets and corre- SS S 2 12
spond to, respectively, member 1 and member 2 in the household. More
speciﬁcally, and S p {(p ; a q ), j p 1, …, T} S p {(p ;( 1  a)q ), 1 jj j 2 jj j
, where if (i.e., individual 1 receives the j p 1, …, T} a p a j  N j 1
share a) and if (i.e., individual 1 receives the share a p 1  a j  N j 2
). To give an example, assume that . In terms of deﬁnition 1  aa p 0.3
4, this means that each individual member gets at least 30 percent of
the total household income. A sufﬁcient condition for such a collective
rationalization to be possible is data consistency with the member-
speciﬁc GARP conditions when the two household members receive
exactly 30 percent or 70 percent of the total household income. How-
ever, the speciﬁc value may vary depending on the speciﬁc observation.
Consequently, for some observations an individual may receive a share
of 70 percent, whereas it may amount to only 30 percent in other
situations.
The nonparametric test for an a-CR ﬁrst transforms the observed
consumption bundles ( ) into and subsequently tests q j p 1, …, T a q jj j
the standard GARP condition on the resulting sets and . The in- SS 12
tuition behind the result is that both individuals must maximize their
utility subject to the shares that are allocated to them and that their
choices must be consistent across the observations, independently of
the fact whether they received the share a or . Of course, since 1  a
intrahousehold allocations are assumed to be Pareto efﬁcient, the GARP
requirement must be simultaneously satisﬁed for both individuals.
At this point, it is worth discussing in some more detail the precise
interpretation of the household allocation process for data that satisfy
the sufﬁcient condition. We note that the above construction of and S1
does not exclude egoistic preferences (which means that externalities S2
are absent). Speciﬁcally, if the data satisfy the sufﬁcient condition, then
we can always specify the feasible personalized prices and
1  p p jj
and the feasible personalized quantities and
2 12  p 0  p a q  p j jj j j
, to obtain a collective rationalization in the sense of deﬁnition (1  a)q jj
4. Still, we must emphasize that this speciﬁcation of these prices and
quantities should not be the unique one that obtains such a collective
rationalization. The only valid conclusion is that, for data that satisfy
the sufﬁcient condition in proposition 4, this (egoistic) representation
of the within-household allocation process always constitutes one pos-
sibility; but there may well be other (nonegoistic) representations that
equally obtain a collective rationalization of the same data.collective consumption models 1095
The sufﬁciency tests based on proposition 4 include some interesting
limiting cases. First, if , then the implications of the above re- a p 0.5
stricted collective model reduce to those of the unitary model. Indeed,
if all consumption bundles are multiplied by 0.5, then it is easily veriﬁed
that the corresponding GARP tests for the individual members are for-
mally equivalent to the unitary GARP test for the household. As such,
we cannot distinguish empirically the 0.5-CR model from the unitary
model. In other words, we obtain the unitary rationality test as a limiting
case within the general class of a-CR tests.
Another limiting case is the test for the situation-dependent dictatorship
model, which is described in proposition 4 of Cherchye et al. (2007).
We obtain this test if we set a equal to zero. The interpretation of the
corresponding collective consumption model is that, depending on the
speciﬁc choice observation at hand, each individual household member
either controls the full household income/expenditures or controls no
income at all. As such, the couple has two “dictatorial” decision makers,
who are each responsible for only a (disjoint) subset of the observed
consumption choices in S. Consequently, the sufﬁcient condition for a
0-CR requires that the observed set S can be partitioned into two subsets
and that individually meet the GARP condition; the sets and SS S 12 1
then correspond to, respectively, member 1 and member 2 as the S2
dictatorial decision makers. We note that in this case the sets and S1
may contain fewer than T observations, whereas in speciﬁcations with S2
, the sets and always consist of T observations. a  ]0, 0.5] SS 12
Two additional remarks are in order with respect to the a-CR restric-
tions in proposition 4. First, one can conceive of alternative reﬁnements
of the sufﬁcient condition. In this respect, we recall that this condition
allows for sharing rule shifts between every two consecutive observations;
in terms of the notation used in proposition 4, this means that for every
two observations i and we can have and (or, i  1 i  Ni  1  N 12
alternatively, and ). Reﬁnements of the sufﬁcient con- i  Ni  1  N 21
dition (and corresponding test) can limit this ﬂexibility for the sharing
rule shifts. We will illustrate such an extension in our empirical appli-
cation.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the fact that the sufﬁcient condition in prop-
osition 4 is generally much easier to test than the necessary condition
in proposition 3. Speciﬁcally, the sufﬁciency tests require checking at
most alternative speciﬁcations of the sets and , which is much
T 2 SS 12
below the maximum number of conﬁgurations in the necessity test.
2 T 3
Again, further efﬁciency gains may be realized by efﬁciency-enhancing
mechanisms such as ﬁltering and subset testing. For the sake of com-
pactness, we refrain from a detailed discussion here, but the treatment
is analogous to the one in Section III. Also, our own application, in-
cluding the computation of the power measures (which imply 1,0001096 journal of political economy
iterations for each household and for the different a-speciﬁcations un-
der consideration), does not utilize efﬁciency-enhancing mechanisms.
Nevertheless, our different exercises required little computation time
(e.g., for a given a the power assessment for the whole sample of all
households took only a couple of minutes for a standard personal com-
puter conﬁguration).
V. Empirical Application of the a-CR Tests
This section presents the results for a-CR tests when applied to our
RLMS data set. As a main focus will be on the power of the alternative
collective rationality models, we ﬁrst outline our procedure for the
power assessment.
A. Power Assessment Method
Generally, a power analysis evaluates the probability of detecting an
alternative hypothesis to the model under study. Bronars (1987) ﬁrst
deﬁned power measures for the unitary model. His alternative hypoth-
esis was based on Becker’s (1962) notion of irrational behavior, which
states that households randomly choose consumption bundles that ex-
haust the available budget. Bronars’ power measures then capture the
probability of rejecting the GARP condition for such randomly drawn
consumption bundles from the observed budget hyperplanes. Our
power assessment basically extends Bronars’ (unitary) procedure to our
collective rationality tests, except from some modiﬁcations that specif-
ically relate to the nature of our RLMS data.
At least two data features affect the power assessment. First, as Bronars
has illustrated, power measures crucially depend on the degree of rel-
ative price variation in the data. For example, if budget hyperplanes do
not intersect for a particular data set, then the unitary model can never
be rejected for this data set. The results in Sections II and III show that
there is enough price variation in our sample for such rejection. Second,
and more speciﬁc to our application, the power assessments should
account for the presence of zero expenditures in the data. Generally,
this is an important feature of microdata on detailed consumption,
which is a particularly relevant consideration for the RLMS (where the
data for each survey round refer to the consumption in a single week).
It should be noted that our focus on nondurables mitigates the zero
expenditure problem to some extent. In addition, given the relative
importance of food in the Russian consumption, the issue of zero ex-
penditures on detailed food items due to infrequency of purchase is
probably less important than in OECD countries. Still, we do believe
that it is important to explicitly take up the presence of zero expen-collective consumption models 1097
ditures in our power assessment. In fact, without explicit correction,
randomly drawing commodity bundles from a household’s budget con-
straint obtains a zero probability of simulating zero consumption of a
certain item. Clearly, such a simulation does not match reality if zero
expenditures are effectively observed.
Given all this, we use a power assessment procedure that starts from
Becker’s (1962) irrational behavior but takes into account the observed
zero expenditures. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst calculate per household h
and per commodity i the proportion of strictly positive expenditures in
the eight household observations. Let us denote this proportion by . zhi
The drawing of household-speciﬁc irrational commodity bundles then
proceeds as follows. First, per commodity i and per time period t we
draw a random number from the uniform distribution between zero
and one. If this commodity- and time-speciﬁc number is greater than
, then the number is set equal to zero. In the opposite case, the zv hi hit
number is the result of a new drawing from the uniform distribution vhit
(between zero and one). Subsequently, the budget share for house- whit
hold h of commodity i at time t is deﬁned as . Finally, the v / v hit hit i
random/irrational quantity bundle for household h at time t is obtained
by multiplying the thus obtained vector of budget shares by the observed
expenditure level (of household h at time t) and dividing the different
components of the resulting vector by the corresponding components
of the observed commodity price vector (for household h at time t).
For each household and for each RLMS round, 1,000 random con-
sumption bundles are constructed in the way just described. The ad-
vantage of the procedure is that it results in an expected proportion of
zero expenditures that complies with the observed proportion. More-
over, if a household does not have any expenditures on a particular
commodity in all eight rounds of the RLMS, then it will never be ran-
domly allocated a consumption bundle with strictly positive expendi-
tures on that commodity.
The randomly constructed consumption bundles can now be used to
estimate the power of the rationality tests associated with different col-
lective consumption models. A power measure gives the probability that
a particular collective rationality test detects such irrational (budget-
exhausting) behavior. Our empirical exercise speciﬁcally considers two
power measures, which exploit the panel structure of our data set and
provide useful complementary information. The ﬁrst measure (labeled
power 1) captures the proportion of the 1,000 random cases in which
Becker’s irrational behavior is detected for at least one household in
the sample. The underlying idea is that a behavioral model is rejected
if not all households can be ﬁt in its theoretical implications. However,
it is well possible that an outlier household completely determines this





Rejections Power 1 Power 2
a p .5 31 100.0 12.63
a p .495 19 100.0 11.74
a p .49 16 100.0 10.17
a p .47 5 100.0 5.89
a p .45 1 99.9 4.05
a p .4 0 96.3 2.15
a p .3 0 68.8 .77
a p .2 0 38.3 .32
a p .01 0 7.8 .06
a p 0* 0 7.5 .05
* Situation-dependent dictatorship.
power 2) gives the average proportion of households in which Becker’s
irrational behavior is detected across all (1,000) randomly drawn sce-
narios. In summary, the power 1 measure captures the power of the
model at the level of the sample as a whole, and the power 2 measure
provides complementary information regarding the power of the model
at the level of the individual households.
B. Empirical Results
Table 3 summarizes the test results associated with the a-CR models
applied to the 148 couples in our sample. Before discussing these results
in greater detail, we recall that our analysis focuses on sufﬁciency tests
for collective rationality. As mentioned before, consistency with the suf-
ﬁcient conditions for a particular a means that there exists at least one
deﬁnition of the collective consumption model (corresponding to spe-
ciﬁc sharing rule restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behavior.
A ﬁrst observation then pertains to the case in which , which a p 0.50
states that the two members divide the household income/expenditures
equally under all circumstances. As discussed before, the empirical im-
plications of this collective model are indistinguishable from those of
the unitary model. Given this, the 31 couples that did not pass the
unitary GARP test (see our discussion in Sec. II) can never meet the
empirical conditions corresponding to this limiting case of the collective
consumption model. This also appears in table 3.
Next, we ﬁnd in the table that all couples meet the (other extreme)
situation-dependent dictatorship condition (for ). This implies a p 0
that there certainly exists a collective rationalization of the data for the
general collective consumption model. We recall that in Section III the
necessary condition for collective rationality is satisﬁed for our sample
of couples. Here we construct a speciﬁcation of the intrahouseholdcollective consumption models 1099
allocation process that is certainly consistent with collective rationality
deﬁned in deﬁnition 3. Given this, one can then investigate which extra
restrictions can be added to this general model. More precisely, here
we regard to what extent the above ﬁndings change for alternative shar-
ing rule constraints. Table 3 makes clear that lower a values result in
more couples passing the associated rationality tests. For example, 19
couples do not satisfy the a-CR restrictions in proposition 4 under
(i.e., the couple’s members receive either 49.5 percent or a p 0.495
50.5 percent of the total expenditures). This number steadily decreases
toward zero for lower a: only a single couple violates the a-CR restric-
tions in proposition 4 for , and all couples meet the sufﬁciency a p 0.45
restrictions when a is not above 0.40.
These ﬁndings suggest that, even though the deﬁnition of the col-
lective consumption models underlying the respective sufﬁcient con-
ditions may seem restrictive to some, a wide range of such models is
effectively able to describe the observed couples’ consumption behavior.
Interestingly, these favorable test results should not necessarily be at-
tributed to a low power of the different a-CR models: the power 1 values
are (quasi) 100 percent for all the models in which a is at least equal
to 0.45; and the value equals no less than 96 percent for the model that
uses a equal to 0.40, which cannot be rejected for any couple in our
sample.
As discussed above, the measure power 2 reveals to what extent these
high power 1 values are supported by generally high power at the level
of the individual households. As for this second measure, we ﬁnd that
the variation across the different collective models is more pronounced
and that, in general, the values are rather low. Speciﬁcally, while the
unitary model (which complies with ) is associated with a power a p 0.50
2 value of 12.63 percent, which means that on average about 13 percent
of the couples do not satisfy the unitary restrictions when behaving
randomly, the power 2 measure decreases rapidly when a becomes
smaller. For example, when , the power 2 value drops to only a p 0.40
2.15 percent, which means that irrational consumption behavior is de-
tected for an average proportion of slightly more than 2 percent of the
couples.
Given our speciﬁc purpose of testing alternative behavioral models,
we attribute a relatively high weight to the favorable power 1 results.
Indeed, the construction of that measure directly complies with our
practice of concluding data consistency with a behavioral model only if
all households simultaneously pass the associated rationality tests. Still, in
some instances the power 2 results may seem more informative. For
example, generally high power estimates at the level of individual house-
holds seem recommendable when addressing recovery questions (e.g.,
regarding the intrahousehold allocation or the preferences of the in-1100 journal of political economy
dividual household members) or forecasting issues (e.g., to predict
household consumption in new price and income situations); see, for
example, Varian (1982, 1983, 2006) and Blundell, Browning, and Craw-
ford (2003, 2008) for nonparametric recovery and forecasting tools in
the unitary setting.
It is interesting to have a closer look at the possible causes of the
relatively low power 2 values. One reasonable explanation for these low
values lies in the fact that we have only eight observations per household:
we may generally expect higher power for larger samples. Moreover, we
conduct our analysis at the level of individual households. Parametric
applications usually assume that at least part of the preference param-
eters are similar across different individuals, which may result in a higher
power to detect alternative hypotheses. Obviously, by its very nature this
parametric treatment of household heterogeneity is subject to the same
risk of speciﬁcation error as the parametric rationality tests themselves.
In view of the particular (nonparametric testing) orientation of the
current study, we believe that it is recommendable to abstract from a
homogeneity assumption across different individuals to maximally avoid
speciﬁcation errors.
Another reason pertains to the fact that the general collective model
of this paper assumes minimal information regarding the intrahouse-
hold allocation. Given the speciﬁc nature of the a-CR tests, natural
extensions assume (or, alternatively, test) a speciﬁc structure regarding
possible shifts in the sharing rule over the observed household choices.
Indeed, we recall that the above sufﬁciency tests allow for sharing rule
shifts between every two consecutive observations. Therefore, as indi-
cated in Section IV, one can reﬁne the sufﬁciency tests by limiting the
ﬂexibility for the sharing rule shifts.
For our application, we illustrate this possibility by using the infor-
mation reported in ﬁgure 1. More speciﬁcally, we investigate the as-
sumption that continuous subperiods of the data that satisfy GARP are
characterized by the same sharing rule, and thus, we allow for sharing
rule shifts only when we run into a GARP violation when adding ob-
servations to the chronological sequence. For example, for pattern 1 in
ﬁgure 1, which corresponds to the 117 couples that are consistent with
GARP when taking the eight period observations together, we assume
that the income shares are the same in all observations. By contrast, for
pattern 2 we allow for a (single) sharing rule shift between periods 2
and 3. And so on. In fact, adding this structure directly complies with
the “collective rationalization” for the GARP violations in ﬁgure 1, which
interprets such violations as revealing shifts in the bargaining power
(and thus the sharing rule) within the household; see our discussion
in Section II.
Table 4 gives the test results for this reﬁned sufﬁcient condition. Wecollective consumption models 1101
TABLE 4
Test Results for a Reﬁned Sufﬁcient Condition
Model
Number of
Rejections Power 1 Power 2
a p .5 31 100.0 12.63
a p .495 29 100.0 13.30
a p .49 26 100.0 13.38
a p .47 16 100.0 12.81
a p .45 14 100.0 12.66
a p .4 9 100.0 11.57
a p .3 3 100.0 11.60
a p .2 1 100.0 11.11
a p .01 0 100.0 10.46
a p 0* 0 100.0 10.43
* Situation-dependent dictatorship.
consider the same a-values as in table 3, but as just explained, we limit
the observations in which a sharing rule shift can take place. We ﬁnd
that all couples pass the reﬁned collective rationality test for and a p 0
. In addition, we observe very few rejections of the collective a p 0.1
rationality conditions for , , and, to a somewhat lesser a p 0.2 a p 0.3
extent, . As before, the number of rejections increases when a a p 0.4
increases. Interestingly, as compared to table 3, table 4 reports much
higher power values, in particular for low a-values (including a p 0
and ). More speciﬁcally, power 1 values are 100 percent for all a p 0.1
models under consideration. In addition, power 2 values are everywhere
close to the value of 12.63 percent that applies to the unitary model.
Generally, the results in table 4 demonstrate the usefulness of assum-
ing additional sharing rule structure when starting from the basic a-CR
condition in proposition 4. This practice obtains tests for the collective
model that are as simple to implement as the basic sufﬁciency tests
themselves. Importantly, these reﬁned tests can be considerably more
powerful than the original tests. We have illustrated this by a speciﬁc
example that builds on the results for the unitary GARP tests to add
intuitive sharing rule structure. But, of course, alternative reﬁnements
can include other sharing rule restrictions for speciﬁc households and
consumption choice observations.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
We have presented a ﬁrst empirical application of nonparametric col-
lective rationality tests that account for public consumption and exter-
nalities within the household. Speciﬁcally, starting from the work of
Cherchye et al. (2007), we analyzed the collective rationalization of
couples that were drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Sur-
vey. Interestingly, the panel structure of this data set allows us to non-1102 journal of political economy
parametrically test the collective consumption model without relying on
preference homogeneity assumptions across similar individuals.
First, we conceived an efﬁcient procedure to test the necessary con-
dition for the general collective consumption model, which does not
put any structure on the public consumption or the within-household
externalities. This procedure includes a number of efﬁciency-enhancing
mechanisms that can substantially lower the computational burden as-
sociated with the necessity test; these operational reﬁnements build on
basic theoretical insights regarding the revealed preference relation-
ships for individual household members. Application of this necessity
test obtains that collective rationality cannot be rejected for the RLMS
data. In addition, it shows the practical usefulness of the efﬁciency-
enhancing testing mechanisms.
Next, we have investigated sufﬁcient conditions for collective ratio-
nality. We ﬁrst developed a novel nonparametric framework for collec-
tive consumption models. This framework is based on the sharing rule
concept, which deﬁnes the within-household distribution of the house-
hold income. The framework incorporates a wide range of special cases
of the general collective consumption model, which incorporate alter-
native assumptions regarding the speciﬁcation of the household-speciﬁc
sharing rules. We then conceived operational sufﬁcient conditions that
enable testing such sharing rule assumptions. Interestingly, these suf-
ﬁcient conditions for collective rationality can be conceived as direct
extensions of the standard unitary rationality conditions. Speciﬁcally,
the associated collective tests imply the unitary GARP tests for simple
transformations of the original data set, which makes them easy to
implement.
Consistency with these sufﬁcient conditions means that there exists
at least one deﬁnition of the collective consumption model (satisfying
speciﬁc sharing rule restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behavior.
Using this, our empirical investigation obtained that a multitude of
collective consumption models are able to describe the couples’ con-
sumption behavior in the RLMS data. For example, we found that there
certainly exists a collective rationalization of each couple within the data
set under the assumption that each household member receives at least
40 percent of the total household income. By contrast, we obtained that
the unitary model is not able to rationalize the observed couples’ be-
havior, whereas it does well ﬁt observed singles’ behavior. Interestingly,
these results are consistent with the results of Browning and Chiappori
(1998) discussed in the introduction. We recall that Browning and
Chiappori provided parametric tests of the alternative behavioral models
and focused on a data set drawn from a time series of cross sections.
Given that our tests are entirely nonparametric and because the panel
structure of our data set avoids potentially distortive preference ho-collective consumption models 1103
mogeneity assumptions across different individuals, this provides strong
evidence in favor of models focusing on intrahousehold decision mak-
ing.
Finally, we have analyzed the power of alternative speciﬁcations of the
collective model (which correspond to different sharing rule restric-
tions). A ﬁrst power measure captures the probability of detecting ir-
rational behavior of at least one household in the sample. This measure
was above 95 percent for a large class of the collective rationality models
that we evaluated. We conclude that the collective rationality tests are
rather powerful at the sample level, which provides strong support for
our above empirical ﬁndings. A second power measure captures the
average/expected proportion of households of which irrational behav-
ior is detected. The values of this measure were rather low for all model
speciﬁcations (including the unitary speciﬁcation). We believe that this
result can at least partly be explained by the availability of only eight
observations per household. In this respect, it is worth noting that our
(necessity and sufﬁciency) tests also apply to larger data sets. Such larger
data sets may entail higher power at the level of individual households
(captured by our second power measure).
Apart from increasing the sample size, another potentially fruitful
strategy for obtaining more powerful collective rationality tests uses
more stringent household-speciﬁc sharing rule restrictions. For instance,
such restrictions can be conceived on the basis of additional prior in-
formation about the intrahousehold allocation process. As we indicated,
it is easy to extend the proposed sufﬁciency tests by adding sharing rule
restrictions that vary for different households and choice observations.
This obtains reﬁned sufﬁciency tests that are as easy to implement as
the basic sufﬁciency tests themselves but can be substantially more pow-
erful. We have illustrated this for our own empirical application by
building on the unitary GARP tests to add structure to the collective
rationality tests. These more powerful tests provided further empirical
support for the collective approach to modeling the consumption be-
havior of multiperson households (in the case of couples).
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